Galula described his experiences in two books,
Pacification in Algeria, published by the RAND Corporation in 1963, and
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice in 1964. His books analyse his experiences in Indochina, Greece and Algeria, giving a taxonomy of favourable and unfavourable settings for a revolutionary war from the point of view of both the revolutionary (insurgent) and loyalist (counterinsurgent) forces. Galula cites Mao Zedong's observation that "[R]evolutionary war is 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military", and proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency:
- The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.
- Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.
- Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.
- Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.
Galula's laws thus take at face value and recognize the importance of the aphorism, based on the ideas of Mao, that "The people are the sea in which the revolutionary swims."Mao Zedong.
On Guerilla Warfare (1937), Chapter 6 - "The Political Problems of Guerilla Warfare":
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.
He contends that:
A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. ... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.
With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control:
In a Selected Area1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerillas.4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.
Some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by the government. Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward."
Galula has been considered an important theorist by contemporary defence experts. Notably, the United States military used his experiences as examples in the context of the Iraq War and he is often quoted in the US Army's
Counterinsurgency Manual. Galula's
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice is highly suggested reading for students of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
