Helpful Score: 1
I started this book on the assumption it would just be an in depth examination of assorted US nuclear weapons accidents since their invention. Pleasantly I was surprised to find that it was much more. The main examination of the book is incident in Damascus, AK, involving a Titan II missile. Interspersed with this story are chapters covering the development not only of nuclear weapons but targeting, command/control, alert procedures and other incidents involving nuclear weapons.
Schlosser does an excellent job keeping to a chronological order and not bouncing around. He repeatedly ties incidents together to prove the point that it took both the Dept of Defense and the Federal government as a whole to learn the critical lessons of having nuclear weapons. There were a multitude of accidents that could have easily been avoided if the decision-makers had listened to the real experts, the people who built the bombs and warheads to begin with.
During the Damascus Accident, Schlosser points out the obvious almost comically stance that the US Air Force took in their obstinate refusal to confirm or deny that a nuclear warhead was involved. I mean really did they think that the general public wouldn't pick up on this when it involved a ICBM unless their is some sort of secret policy to only put warheads on some of the missiles to keep the Ruskies guessing which missiles are actually armed.
This book is a must read for military history buffs. The flip side is that I would also recommend it for any decision maker in any organization. During the response to the Damascus Accident the response with repeat with missed opportunities to resolve the problem before the explosion. Time and time again commanders on scene either refused to take action or had their hands tied by higher ups hundreds of miles away.
In the end the reader will come away from this book wondering how the hell we did not accidentally wipe out at least one of our own cities or military bases. It will actually scare you how close we came a few times.
Schlosser does an excellent job keeping to a chronological order and not bouncing around. He repeatedly ties incidents together to prove the point that it took both the Dept of Defense and the Federal government as a whole to learn the critical lessons of having nuclear weapons. There were a multitude of accidents that could have easily been avoided if the decision-makers had listened to the real experts, the people who built the bombs and warheads to begin with.
During the Damascus Accident, Schlosser points out the obvious almost comically stance that the US Air Force took in their obstinate refusal to confirm or deny that a nuclear warhead was involved. I mean really did they think that the general public wouldn't pick up on this when it involved a ICBM unless their is some sort of secret policy to only put warheads on some of the missiles to keep the Ruskies guessing which missiles are actually armed.
This book is a must read for military history buffs. The flip side is that I would also recommend it for any decision maker in any organization. During the response to the Damascus Accident the response with repeat with missed opportunities to resolve the problem before the explosion. Time and time again commanders on scene either refused to take action or had their hands tied by higher ups hundreds of miles away.
In the end the reader will come away from this book wondering how the hell we did not accidentally wipe out at least one of our own cities or military bases. It will actually scare you how close we came a few times.
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