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21st Century U.S. Military Documents, Anti-Satellite Systems (ASAT), Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear Anti-Satellite System and Present-Day Copycat Killers, ... from India, North Korea, Iran, and China
21st Century US Military Documents AntiSatellite Systems Program 437 the US Nuclear AntiSatellite System and PresentDay Copycat Killers from India North Korea Iran and China - ASAT Author:Department of Defense This is a complete reproduction of an April 2000 Pentagon "CADRE" paper from the U.S. Air Force Academy, Institute of National Security Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base entitled Shooting Down a Star - Program 437, the US Nuclear SAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers by Clayton K. S. Chun, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF. CADRE Papers are occasional... more » publications sponsored by the Airpower Research Institute of Air University?s College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education (CADRE). From the Foreword: "Space-based systems of various kinds had proven their worth well before the end of the cold war. But it was only during the Persian Gulf War that the enormous multiplier effect of space systems on combat operations became widely recognized. In the immediate aftermath of that conflict, then Air Force chief of staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak went so far as to describe Operation Desert Storm as America?s "first space war." Military exploitation of space has markedly accelerated during the years since 1991. So has US reliance on the satellite systems that inhabit that immense realm. [This paper] is a case study of an early U.S. antisatellite (ASAT) weapon system. In this study, Colonel Chun shows how the US Air Force developed a rudimentary ASAT system from obsolete Thor intermediate ballistic missiles, an existing space tracking system, and nuclear warheads. Largely forgotten today, this system helped to defend the United States from 1964 until the demise of the program in the mid-1970s. Since many of Program 437?s components were from off-the-shelf weapons stocks and ready to field after a short development program, the Air Force?s first ASAT system was relatively inexpensive to create, deploy, and operate. In tracing the evolution of this ASAT system based on 1950s technology, Colonel Chun notes that a growing number of nations today have access to technology of much more recent vintage. He then proceeds to address in some detail the vulnerability of space-based systems that have become essential to the security and operational prowess of the United States and its allies. Given growing US reliance on space systems for warning, employment of precision weapons, communications, navigation and positioning support, weather reporting, and surveillance and reconnaissance, Colonel Chun?s study constitutes a timely reminder of the threat that even a rudimentary ASAT could pose. The US Air Force Academy?s Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) sponsored Colonel Chun?s research." From the Preface: "From 1963 to 1975, the United States Air Force (USAF) operated a working ASAT system, Program 437, in the Pacific. The Air Force was able to rapidly cobble together an operational system out of deactivated missile components, existing launch pads, and a space tracking system to create the capability to use nuclear antisatellite weapons in a direct ascent mode to destroy orbiting space vehicles. Many nations today have the ability to acquire the ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads to produce similar, if not superior, systems to what the United States was able to field using aging booster rockets. Given that the technology is more readily available today than during the 1960s and 1970s, several nations may be capable of threatening the space assets of the United States and its allies. Could a foreign country deny space superiority to US military forces and neutralize many of the space-based capabilities that are integral to present-day war-fighting plans of US and allied joint force commanders? My research and analysis indicates that four nations - North Korea, India, China, and Iran - are capable of duplicating or exceeding the capabilities of Program 437."« less